A Socio-Technical and Co-Evolutionary Framework for Reducing Human-Related Risks in Cyber Security and Cybercrime Ecosystems by Islam, Tasmina et al.
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Islam, Tasmina and Becker, Ingolf and Posner, Rebecca and Ekblom, Paul and McGuire, Michael
and Borrion, Hervé and Li, Shujun  (2019) A Socio-Technical and Co-Evolutionary Framework
for Reducing Human-Related Risks in Cyber Security and Cybercrime Ecosystems.    In:   Proceedings
of 5th International Conference on Dependability in Sensor, Cloud, and Big Data Systems and
DOI




A Socio-Technical and Co-Evolutionary
Framework for Reducing Human-Related Risks
in Cyber Security and Cybercrime Ecosystems
Tasmina Islam1[0000−0002−6437−8251], Ingolf Becker2[0000−0002−3963−4743],
Rebecca Posner3[0000−0001−5744−5922], Paul Ekblom2,4[0000−0002−6599−6174],
Michael McGuire5[0000−0002−8525−9104], Herve´ Borrion2[0000−0003−3624−4763],
and Shujun Li1()[0000−0001−5628−7328]
1 University of Kent, UK
{T.Islam,S.J.Li}@kent.ac.uk
2 University College London, UK
{i.becker,p.ekblom,h.borrion}@ucl.ac.uk
3 TRL Ltd, UK
rposner@trl.co.uk
4 Central Saint Martins, University of the Arts London, UK
p.ekblom@csm.arts.ac.uk
5 University of Surrey, UK
m.mcguire@surrey.ac.uk
Abstract. The focus on cyber security as an interaction between tech-
nical elements and humans has typically confined consideration of the
latter to practical issues of implementation, conventionally those of ‘hu-
man performance factors’ of vigilance etc., ‘raising awareness’ and/or
‘incentivization’ of people and organizations to participate and adapt
their behavior. But this is far too narrow a view that seriously constrains
the ability of cyber security as a whole to adapt and evolve to keep up
with adaptive, innovative attackers in a rapidly-changing technological,
business and social landscape, in which personal preferences of users are
also dynamically evolving.
While there is isolated research across different research areas, we noticed
the lack of a holistic framework combining a range of applicable theoreti-
cal concepts (e.g., cultural co-evolution such as technological arms races,
opportunity management, behavioral and business models) and techno-
logical solutions on reducing human-related risks in the cyber security
and cybercrime ecosystems, which involve multiple groups of human ac-
tors including offenders, victims, preventers and promoters. This paper
reports our ongoing work in developing such a socio-technical frame-
work 1) to allow a more comprehensive understanding of human-related
risks within cyber security and cybercrime ecosystems and 2) to sup-
port the design of more effective approaches to engaging individuals and
organizations in the reduction of such risks. We are in the process of
instantiating this framework to encourage behavioral changes in two use
cases that capture diverse and complicated socio-technical interactions
in cyber-physical systems.
Keywords: Socio-technical · framework · Human factors · Human be-
havior · Risk management · Cyber security · Cybercrime · Co-evolution
· Ontology · Transportation · Human-as-a-Security-Sensor (HaaSS)
1 Introduction
Cyber security has increasingly become challenging for businesses, governments,
the general public and the society as a whole. The IBM X-Force Threat In-
telligence Index 2019 [32] reported that finance and insurance, transportation,
professional and health-care services were the most targeted sectors in 2018 and
inadvertent human error facilitated most of the attacks and incidents. Over the
years, researchers in different disciplines (e.g., computer, crime, behavioral and
social sciences) have consistently identified and acknowledged the role of human
behavior and human error in security incidents. According to [29], almost 90%
of cyber attacks are caused by human error or behavior, but organizations often
undermine the control of human-related errors and prioritize technical controls
as a major remedy for security breaches [33,30]. In most cases this is due to a
misconception of the term ‘cyber’ crime, namely that it occurs purely within a
non-physical (cyber) domain without any social or human-related element seen
in traditional/physical crimes. At the same time, researchers are encouraging a
shift in thinking where security has to work in collaboration with humans [6,42,7].
‘Hyper-connectivity’ [38], the unprecedented linking of individuals and tech-
nologies into vast new global social-physical networks, “opens up more points
of presence for attack and exploitation” [5,35]. Due to this ‘hyper-connectivity’
of human and technology, the complexity and unpredictability of vulnerabilities
have increased exponentially. One major approach to reducing material crime,
situational prevention [12,22], seeks to reduce opportunity for offending by alter-
ing the environment within which offenders operate so as to increase (perceived)
risk and effort to the offender, reduce (perceived) rewards and provocations and
remove excuses. It however has yet to be fully applied to cybercrime and brought
together with the concept of hyper-connectivity.
Likewise, ecological and evolutionary concepts can be brought in. Ecologi-
cally, in this hyper-connected cyber-physical environment humans and corporate
socio-technical agents such as businesses and organizations play various roles
(e.g., offender, preventer, target, victim, etc.) and interact through conflict, co-
operation, coalition, commensalism in a common ‘habitat’ [9,10]. This complex,
non-linear process in the ecosystem can lead to co-evolution [16], for example
arms races between offenders and preventers through techniques, procedures and
designs [18,34]. The dynamic evolution of cyber systems is faster than in biolog-
ical evolution or material culture, being based on convention and coding rather
than physical necessity. Criminal techniques also continually evolve as offenders
adapt to hazards and exploit opportunities [43]. Some recent work appreciates
the power of evolutionary approaches in enhancing cyber security [8,14,11], but
progress is fragmentary and limited.
This dynamic interactivity and co-evolution within the cyber risk ecosystem
raises practical concerns, particularly how to mobilize a diverse population of
individuals and organizations to support security by acting as preventers and
not promoters of crime (those who inadvertently, carelessly or deliberately in-
crease the risk of crime, e.g., by leaving their terminal unlocked or providing
exploit kits). According to the CLAIMED framework reported in [17], effective
mobilization requires agents with a preventer role to be alerted, informed, mo-
tivated (e.g., with incentives or regulations), empowered and perhaps directed.
Such mobilization is constrained by the lack of personalization and information
about dynamically evolving personal preferences at individual level.
While there is isolated research across different areas, we are not aware of any
holistic framework combining all these theoretical approaches, e.g., co-evolution,
opportunity management, behavioral and business models, with ad hoc technolo-
gies on cyber risks and specific types of cybercrime, to allow a more comprehen-
sive understanding of human-related risks within cyber security ecosystems and
to design more effective approaches for mobilizing individuals and organizations,
and designing human-ICT systems, in the reduction of such risks. Therefore, the
main aim of this paper is to present such a socio-technical framework addressing
cyber-security and cybercrime via a co-evolutionary approach to reduce human-
related risks in the human/cyber ecosystems. The framework combines a range
of applicable theories and data-driven analysis with the aim to create a com-
putational ontology and knowledge base, which can support the design of more
effective software tools to engage individuals and organizations for the reduction
of human-related risks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief
review of some selected related work. The main body of this research is pre-
sented in Section 3, where we describe the proposed framework and the research
approaches chosen. This is followed by an architectural overview of our work
(Section 4), and two use cases that instantiate the framework to change human
behavior to reduce cyber risks (Section 5). We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Related work
This section presents a brief review of some selected relevant research studies
and projects.
Many cyber security attacks are caused by human errors and attackers are
focusing more on exploiting human vulnerabilities [29,21,32]. Therefore, under-
standing human roles in supporting cyber security is becoming more important.
Joinson and van Steen suggested integrating culture, behavior and the design of
security tools and policies for this purpose [28].
Dykstra and Orr proposed a human decision analysis framework to identify
context of the security risk and response appropriately in complex situations [15],
where Ganin et al. proposed a multicriteria decision framework which integrates
risk assessment (threat, vulnerability and consequences) for prioritizing counter-
measures through a user-friendly software [23].
The co-evolutionary aspect of cyber security and its potential benefits (in
terms of allowing a more dynamic, ‘naturalistic’ response to system threats)
have not been widely researched to date. Where this concept has been examined
the work has largely involved algorithmically driven approaches. For example,
the “Co-evolutionary Agent-based Network Defense Lightweight Event System”
(CANDLES), discussed in [41] is “a framework designed to co-evolve attacker
and defender agent strategies and evaluate potential solutions with a custom, ab-
stract computer network defense simulation”. By utilizing a qualitative analysis
of the result data, the aim was to provide a proof of concept for the applicability
of co-evolution in planning for, and defending against, novel attacker strate-
gies in computer network security. This focus upon fairly limited, exclusively
software-focused co-evolution in cyber security.
The situational approach to the causation and prevention of crime originated
in the material world. Research links to cybercrime have been limited (e.g.,
see [37,13]), although this is now changing [27], and the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime has recently developed educational modules connecting
these approaches6. Equally rare are socio-technical approaches to crime, as social
and technological research have tended to operate in separate cultural silos (see
e.g. [36]); exceptions based on cultural/technological co-evolution include (e.g.,
terrorism [18], crime [19]).
As a special area of cyber security that requires a more holistic approach, a
lot of work on privacy protection has considered a socio-technical approach, but
as far as we know the co-evolutionary aspect has not been considered. In the
following, we briefly introduce some related work in this area.
Robol et al. reported their work towards building data protection law com-
pliant socio-technical systems [40], focusing on the new EU GDPR (General
Data Protection Regulation). They utilize a goal based modeling language that
allows the modelling of “social aspects of the GDPR, such as, the relationship
between data subjects, data controllers, data processors, employer, and employ-
ees, in the context of personal data processing” to automatically verify privacy
policies. Similarly, Raschke et al. [39] reported a design and implementation of
a GDPR-compliance related privacy dashboard addressing the requirements of
the GDPR and enabling users to execute data privacy rights with the tool.
In ‘Privacy Flag’ [3], a European Commission funded research project, crowd-
sourcing based mechanisms are considered for identifying, monitoring and as-
sessing privacy-related risks, in combination with ICT technologies and legal
expertise on data protection laws such as GDPR. Privacy risks are identified
by distributing privacy monitoring agents on users’ smart phones and websites.
Users are made aware about identified risks by being informed about the risks
when they are using different computer applications.
Another European research project, ‘OPERANDO’ (Online Privacy Enforce-
ment, Rights Assurance and Optimization) [1], enables the Privacy as a Service
(PaS) business paradigm and the market for online privacy services by imple-
menting and exploiting an innovative privacy enforcement platform. An impor-
tant aspect of this project is to provide a simple privacy dashboard for end users,
allowing them to control their privacy settings in their regularly used platforms.
6 https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/tertiary/cybercrime.html.
A tool called PlusPrivacy [2] has been launched as a web or smart phone app
as part of the OPERANDO project, which allows users to specify their privacy
preferences in online social networks, for purposes such as blocking ads, malware,
tracker, unwanted apps or extensions, and hiding their email identity [24].
The aim of yet another European research project ‘SPECIAL’ (Scalable
Policy-aware Linked Data Architecture For Privacy, Transparency and Com-
pliance) [4] is to develop technologies that collect proper consents for data and
metadata in order to enable secure and privacy respecting workflows. A partic-
ular focus of this project is on data processing in big data environments where
individual’s privacy choices are often neglected.
From the above brief review of related work, we can see that, although there
are isolated socio-technical works on addressing human-related risks in cyber
security, there is no holistic framework that allows a more comprehensive under-
standing of human-related risks within cyber security ecosystems and enables
the design of more effective approaches for engaging individuals and organiza-
tions in the reduction of such risks. Particularly, the co-evolutionary aspect is
not well considered in the literature. Our proposed framework in this paper will
fill this gap.
3 Methodology
Our proposed framework is built around four aspects we consider important:
– Cyber security and cybercrime are better viewed as dynamic processes, so ap-
plying an approach based on learning/development and cultural co-evolution
will facilitate our understanding and help generate best interventions amid
diverse contexts and over a sustained period during which offenders are si-
multaneously seeking to develop countermeasures.
– Human-related risks in cyber security and cybercrime ecosystems can be
better understood if the concept of cyber-physical hyper-connectivity is ap-
plied to expose more complicated interactions among different stakeholders
occupying diverse crime-related roles, environmental factors, events and con-
sequences.
– Personalization and contextualization can help better incentivize people and
organizations to adapt their behaviors towards reduced cyber risks and vic-
timization rates and at the same time glean more accurate information to
better understand those behaviors.
– Theoretical concepts from social psychology and cultural evolution, and com-
putational software tools can be combined to form a socio-technical frame-
work applicable to real-world cyber security use cases.
To address these aspects we adopt a hybrid (top-down and bottom-up)
approach combining both theory and data-driven analysis (see Sections 3.1
and 3.2). We are developing an ontology of the risk ecosystem (see Section 3.3)
to facilitate computational approaches to handling the dynamics of interactions
between offenders, preventers, promoters and victims over various timescales and
a socio-technical framework to foster practical implementations that can benefit
end users directly (see Section 3.4). Our methodology is visualized in Fig. 1, and
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Fig. 1. The general methodology of our research towards a socio-technical and co-
evolutionary framework for reducing human-related risks in cyber security and cybe-
crime ecosystems.
3.1 The Top-Down Approach
This approach incorporates theoretical concepts from social, biological and be-
havioral sciences that provide useful insights into the co-evolutionary aspect of
cyber security and cybercrime ecosystems. That is, how cyber attackers (‘preda-
tors’), victims (‘prey’), security service providers and law enforcement (‘preven-
ters’) constantly and dynamically adapt their behaviors in response to each other
within the ecosystems involving information technology, interactions among peo-
ple and organizations, regulations and policies.
A computational ontology is needed to capture such theoretical concepts
to allow software tools to make use of them. To this end, we are developing
such an ontology to identify the key agents and processes within cyber security
ecosystems. This is especially important where analyzing problems and devising
solutions involving computational approaches. More details of the ontology are
given below in Section 3.3.
3.2 The Bottom-Up Approach
In this approach extensive real-world data is drawn from different sources on
behaviors of individuals (with different roles) and public/private organizations
within cyber security and cybercrime ecosystems. Data is collected through a
combination of social methods (e.g., ethnographic interviews and surveys, focus
group interviews, and psychometric testing sessions) and technological ones (e.g.,
automated data collection and behavioral monitoring, (semi-)automated data
analytics, and data mining), in order to gather the ethnographic and behavioral
information needed to build a cyber security and cybercrime knowledge base.
Combining the computational ontology with the knowledge base, we can
build software tools that can understand cyber security and cybercrime ecosys-
tems especially behaviors of stakeholders (individuals and organizations) better.
This will allow more intelligent tools to help stakeholders (victims and preven-
ters) to better respond to cyber attacks and cybercrime, hopefully helping them
win (or at least keep up in) the arms race against cyber attackers and criminals.
3.3 Ontology
Originally a term in traditional philosophy, ‘ontology’ is now used to refer to
a formal naming and definition of types, properties, and inter-relationships of
entities that exist for a particular domain of discourse in science, practice or in
this case, both. Ontologies have been heavily used within computer science be-
cause of the need for coding concepts and coding language that is clear enough
to be represented conceptually and computationally. To make co-evolutionary
processes tractable for modeling within a cyber security and cybercrime con-
text, three fundamental aspects of interaction between agents (i.e., individuals,
organizations, and intelligent software technologies) and environments in which
they behave, operating over successively longer timescales, were identified as the
basis for the proposed ontology.
Before giving more details of our proposed ontology, let us clarify what some
key terms mean. ‘Agency’ could be vested in individuals, groups, organizations
and intelligent software. ‘Environment’ includes the cyber and or social envi-
ronment, as well as other agents who may be potential victims or third parties,
and either hostile or supportive. Indeed, to cope with the messy complexity of
social and commercial life, agents are best described through roles. Crime roles
include ‘offenders’ (who is doing the cyber attack), ‘preventers’ (who aims to
reduce the risk, whether to themselves as potential victims or to third parties),
‘promoters’ (who increase the risk of crimes committed by others, whether ac-
cidentally, carelessly or deliberately) and ‘victims’ (who are adversely affected
by the cyber crime) [20]. Responders act after the crime, to limit or mitigate
any harm, or pursue offenders. ‘Civil’ roles of concern to us include at least
end users, employees, managers, and system designers. Any civil role can over-
lap with any crime role, e.g., an agent could be both a system designer and
a crime promoter if the software designed is insecure. ‘Opportunity’, and its
exploitation, creation and denial, could equally be from the perspective of the
offender, or that of security [19] — indeed, the offender’s opportunity is the se-
curity manager’s problem (e.g., the situational context of an attempted breach
and a successful/unsuccessful security response to this), and vice-versa.
Our ontology includes three core elements: Ecology (ECO), Development
(DEVO), Evolution (EVO). We are in the process of developing an initial high-
level ontology. In this paper, we will briefly introduce the three core elements
below, and leave greater details of the ontology for another follow-up paper.
Ecology (ECO) relates to the interactions of agents within their environ-
ment, centring mainly on opportunity and using their existing repertoire of be-
havior and resources. In today’s cyber-physical environment, agents can be de-
scribed simultaneously through crime roles and ‘civil’ roles. The offender and
preventer may be empowered by particular physical, psychological or informa-
tional resources. Civil roles overlap with the crime roles in diverse combinations.
The target of cybercrime may be human (i.e., the victim) or some physical or
cyber asset; and the interaction occurs in a wider environment which may favour
the offender or the preventer. The whole thing can be called the ‘risk ecosystem’.
Development (DEVO) relates to the learning that individuals and or-
ganizations can achieve during their career as offenders, preventers, promoters,
responders or victims7. This could come from solving a problem in the here-and-
now that can be remembered and reproduced if it proves a useful extension of
their repertoire in tackling similar challenges in later times and other contexts.
Alternatively, it may be gained through social learning.
Evolution (EVO) details how the relevant agent populations generate a
variety of traits, and transmit the successful ones to succeeding generations, in-
cluding via active teaching and via online guides and exploit kits, and how the
traits change over ‘generations’ in response to selection pressures (i.e., successes
and failures of crime commission or prevention). Here, the emphasis is on cul-
tural [31] or symbolic [26] evolution, which shares many properties with biolog-
ical evolution but is far less constrained and canalized. Since we are concerned
with progressive behaviors of individuals and organizations playing all crime
roles, reciprocal counter-adaptations in the security arms race, co-evolution is of
particular interest.
7 This is less straightforward for victim and promoter roles, as both could develop into
preventers or even offenders.
3.4 Socio-Technical Framework
Based on the hybrid approach, the ontology and the knowledge base, we can build
a socio-technical framework that will work with end users and organizations in
the cyber security and cybercrime ecosystems. The main idea is to combine
the following three key elements to support the development of a user-centric
software architecture and tool-set (see Section 4).
1. (Semi-)Automated behavioral sensors to reduce burden of reporting : A ma-
jor problem of existing cyber security and cybercrime reporting systems is the
difficulties engaging users and getting such reports processed manually. This is
one of the reasons why system designers are often lagging behind cyber attack-
ers and criminals. For our framework, we proposed to deploy (semi-)automated
behavioral sensors on end users’ computing devices in such a way that they do
not need to fill a lot of rigid and lengthy forms to report cyber security inci-
dents and cybercrime cases. The key to make this part possible in real world
is to incentivize end users with tangible benefits, e.g., reduced efforts of report-
ing incidents and more situational awareness made possible via such behavioral
sensing. Privacy should be paid special attention so that users can have full con-
trol on what such sensors are monitoring and what data are shared with what
external entities for what purposes. Behavioral sensors deployed on end users’
devices will still interact with the user from time to time, but such interactions
will be significantly reduced. Such behavioral sensors also include passive sensors
deployed as OSINT (open-source intelligence) tools so that behaviors of cyber
attackers and criminals can also be collected.
2. More personalized and contextualized responses: With behavioral sensors
deployed on the user’s own devices, the system and other entities playing the role
of preventers can personalize their responses to the target user and contextualize
the responses according to the nature of the cyber security problems much more
easily. This includes tailoring the incentivizing strategies following the user’s set
preferences and psychological profiles. The personalization and contextualization
process will have human experts in the loop to overcome accuracy problems of
fully automated systems.
3. Embedded cyber security awareness and behavioral nudging in the whole
process: The behavioral sensors deployed at the user side can work with online
services provided by third parties playing a crime role of preventers (e.g., IT
services of organizations, law enforcement, more educated friends and family
members) to better embed cyber security awareness and behavioral nudging
elements into the whole ecosystem.
The whole framework has a closed feedback loop so that any new information
gathered through the relevant tools will be fed back to evolve the framework and
its different components accordingly, which include but are not limited to the
computational ontology, the knowledge base and all the tools themselves, in
addition to helping human actors to evolve. Combining with evolving people,







































Fig. 2. The proposed socio-technical framework with a closed loop.
A graphical representation of the framework with a closed loop can be found
in Fig. 2. It shows how different groups of human actors are involved in the
framework, with (potential) offenders on the left, (potential) victims and pro-
moters in the middle, and preventers on the right. There are three groups of
arrows showing how different types of information flow within the framework:
1) red arrows representing behavioral information about offenders flowing to
potential victims and preventers; 2) yellow arrows representing information of
the user environments that can flow to offenders and preventers; 3) blue arrows
representing information with preventers that can flow to (potential) victims,
(potential) promoters, and (potential) offenders. Note that some human actors
may have overlapping roles, e.g., a money mule may be both a victim and a
criminal.
4 Software Framework
To implement the socio-technical framework described in Section 3.4, we need to
consider how practical software tools can be developed and with what computing
systems they will work. In this section, we describe a possible software framework
shown in Fig. 3, which includes some user-centric software tools running from
the user’s own device.
The user-centric software interacts with users and external data sources to get
useful behavioral data the user can see, and also with user-selected preventers for


































Fig. 3. A possible software framework for implementing the socio-technical framework.
Different data plugins are needed to support collecting data from different data
sources, and they collectively form a behavioral data manager (BDM). To allow
the user to manage his/her personal data shared with preventers’ servers without
privacy concerns, a dynamic consent manager (DCM) equipped with a data
anonymizer is needed to ensure all data flowing out of the user’s device are
processed properly with the user’s explicit consent. Behavioral data dynamically
collected by the user-centric software tools can be stored either locally or on a
remote personal data storage or both (e.g., the local storage can be used as an
oﬄine cache of behavioral data). A typical example of the user-centric software
is a mobile app running from the user’s mobile device or a web application that
can run from multiple devices of the user.
The remote personal data storage may be simple cloud-based online drives,
but can also be more complicated personal data management platforms (PDMPs),
such as Solid (https://solid.mit.edu/), Databox (https://www.databoxproject.
uk/), Hub-of-all-things (https://www.hubofallthings.com/) and digi.me (https:
//digi.me/), which allow users to manage their own data for multiple online
services more easily. Such platforms often have an interface to allow data I/O
with external software, so they can be incorporated into the user-centric software
tools of our proposed framework.
The preventers’ servers are also very important because they provide the
needed feedback to the user. There are two main types of feedback: informa-
tion for cyber security situational awareness enhancement, and information for
behavioral nudging, which are processed by two separate components of the user-
centric software, situational awareness dashboard (SAD) and behavioral nudging



















Fig. 4. Human-related security risks within hybrid transportation networks.
some data not shared with the preventers’ servers can still be considered locally
to help the user.
The computational ontology and the knowledge base we explained in the
previous section can be used to support both the user-centric software tools
and also the preventers’ servers. They can be implemented as public data that
can be retrieved from different computer applications. When necessary, personal
data available on the user’s device can be used to personalize the computational
ontology and the knowledge base, e.g., storing a reduced version relevant for
the target user only. On the preventers’ servers, the computational ontology
and the knowledge base should be able to cover all users the preventers aim at
supporting.
5 Use Cases
The software framework described in the previous section is very generic. For
different user groups and contexts, different software tools will have to be imple-
mented, although they share many common software components. This means
that we need to look at concrete use cases for real-world implementations, in
order to validate the effectiveness of the proposed framework. We are currently
conducting research and development work on two such use cases, which we
describe in the following two subsections.
5.1 Human-related security risks within hybrid transportation
networks
Through the proposed framework this use case will focus on understanding the
role of human behavior within an increasingly connected transport system to
prevent an emerging type of cyber-physical crimes. These crimes include per-
petrators collecting data through intelligent transport systems (e.g., connected
vehicles or public transport systems) or transport-based apps in order to plan
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Fig. 5. Human-as-a-Security-Sensor with a feedback loop.
cyber or cyber-physical attacks on vehicles, transport systems or individuals
involved (e.g., drivers and passengers).
The use case will start with investigating the values and motivations that
influence location sharing behaviors of transport users (potential victims) on
transport-related mobile apps as well as how these vary across different segments
of the population (shown in Fig. 4). From an ecological, here-and-now perspec-
tive, we also need to understand general cyber-physical behaviors of users and
offenders and how this relates to the socio-technical environment within which
both parties operate and conflict with one another.
Because today’s transportation networks are very complicated, there are still
many different data and attacks we can consider for this use case. In order to
provide a more tangible use case, we will narrow down to user behavior around
sharing geolocation data, and for the offenders side we will consider privacy at-
tacks that can be conducted based on leaked geolocation data. For preventers,
we will use ourselves (cyber security researchers) to mimic different types of
preventers in real world. The feedback loop will be implemented by informing
the user about geolocation data shared and data consumers, and by providing
concrete recommendations for the user to adapt his/her geolocation data shar-
ing behavior to reduce privacy attacks. A number of mobile apps supporting
geolocation sharing have been identified as data sources for developing behav-
ioral sensors. We will develop a mobile app to implement the software framework
described in the previous section, and human participants will be recruited to
use the mobile app in order to verify if and how they will adapt their behavior
due to interactions with our simulated preventers’ servers.
5.2 Human-as-a-Security-Sensor (HaaSS)
This use case looks at the scenario of security attack reporting by users to IT
departments of organizations or other cyber security service providers. We will
look at adding a feedback loop to the Human-as-a-Security-Sensor (HaaSS) sys-
tem reported in [25], in order to test if the closed-loop process can help improve
human reporters’ performance in reporting cyber attacks (shown in Fig. 5). Sim-
ulated social engineering attacks will be conducted in the same way as reported
in [25]. Multiple rounds of user studies are planned to hopefully allow us to
observe an evolutionary effect. The user-centric software and a simulated server
will be developed based on the original HaaSS software system, collaborating
with the authors of [25].
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a socio-technical framework for addressing human-related
risks in cyber security and cybercrime ecosystems. It is a closed-loop frame-
work, considering different human actors playing different crime roles (offenders,
preventers, promoters, responders and victims). It follows a hybrid approach to
combine theories and data-driven analysis, aiming at creating a computational
ontology and a knowledge base that can support user-facing software tools and
preventers-facing analytics at the server side. The framework has (potential)
victims and promoters at the center, and employs behavioral sensing to enable
more personalized and contextualized feedback from preventers for the purpose
of reducing human-related attacks. We are currently working on software im-
plementations of the framework for two use cases, and will conduct user studies
to verify the effectiveness of the developed software tools on recruited human
participants in simulated cyber security scenarios.
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